The aims of OFFA were variously laid out to be to "safeguard and promote access" and "to protect the poorest students", with the expectation of "the most [effort] , in terms of outreach and financial support, from institutions whose records suggest that they have furthest to go in securing a diverse student body" (Clarke 2004) . The OFFA mission, at its inception, was therefore both one of protecting the current admissions profile in terms of the social mix, but also to see progress on participation and access, especially from the 'top universities'. However, as McCaig and Adnett (2009) note, this stopped short of placing a requirement for specific improvements onto individual institutions, wherever they may have been in the hierarchy. For this reason, among others, OFFA has been repeatedly challenged for being light-touch and toothless (Thomson 2003; Baty 2004; Jones and Thomas 2005; Gill 2009 ) and its sanctions over universities have never been used (NAO 2008) .
One intended consequence of the 2004 Higher Education Act was to create a market based on price competition for tuition fees. However, this policy objective was not realised, with nearly every institution charging the maximum amount of £3,000 from the outset. In contrast, it could be argued that a competitive market in bursaries has emerged, with a myriad of schemes being put in place by higher education providers to further their individual missions in the context of their Access Agreements. Widely different sums of money have been made available to students using widely different eligibility criteria. A conservative estimate is that 350 separate schemes came into existence, focusing on income, academic merit, geographical location, school type, disability, ethnicity and so on (Harrison, Baxter and Hatt 2007) . Just under £100m was dispersed in this way in 2006/07, accounting for around a quarter of the total additional tuition fee income.
Research by McCaig and Adnett (2009) has revealed a clear stratification within the market for income-contingent bursaries, with higher status universities (including the Russell Group) tending to offer roughly twice as much per student, on average, as lower status institutions (NAO 2008) .
However, because of their entry profile, the numbers of bursaries offered by top universities is relatively low, with lower status universities offering bursaries to a larger pool of students. McCaig and Adnett (2009) found that, contrary to the Secretary of State's expectations (Clarke 2004) , there was no evidence that 'top universities' were investing more than those with an already diverse entry profile, although there was significant variation between institutions.
Furthermore, they note that institutions have tended to reduce their expenditure on incomebased bursaries since 2008/09 in favour of scholarships based on merit, 'academic potential' or subjects which struggle to recruit. In a contrary view, Callender, Wilkinson and Hopkin (2009) have recently argued that bursaries have been particularly efficacious in widening access to Russell Group institutions, where students report that the bursary offer is influential in their decisionmaking processes.
At the end of the decade, widening participation and fair access continued to be key policy issues, and there were signs that positions had begun to harden, with more critical comment emerging about progress made by Russell Group universities. A National Audit Office report into widening participation found that with reference to sector-wide widening participation benchmarks (these will be explained in more detail below), The particular dataset used here relates to young (aged under 21 on entry) full-time undergraduate students on their first degree course (i.e. it excludes sub-degree level courses).
This subset comprises around two-thirds of the total full-time higher education entrants. This was selected in order to limit the possible confounding factors, such as differing financial support arrangements for older students and the creation and growth of foundation degrees, and to thereby offer a broadly homogenous population across the period of analysis. The timeframe used is the six academic years from 2003/04 to 2008/09 6 and the dataset refers to new entrants 7 .
Three widening participation performance indicators are published annually for each institution:
6 In reality, data is only available for a subset of these years due to definitional changes which render year-on-year comparison impossible. For 2008/09, the method used to elicit social class data differs from previous years, while the construction of the benchmarks has also changed significantly. Where such problems exist, these are highlighted in the text. 7 Full details of the definitions used in the dataset are available at http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1447&Itemid=141
For the purposes of this study, the institutions in the HESA dataset have been divided into three 
Findings
The headline data for widening participation presented above therefore suggests that access to full-time degree-level courses in England for young students has become slightly wider overall since 2003/04. By 2007/08, more young students from state schools and colleges and from lower socio-economic groups were attending such courses than five years previously; a trend that continued into 2008/09 for the former. Table 1 shows that this trend has not been consistent, [ Table 1 here]
To place these statistics in context, around 42% of the population are drawn from NS-SEC groups 4 to 7, while an estimated 7-14% of young people attend private schools prior to their entry to university; no exact figures exist and the proportion with some experience of private education is doubtlessly higher than the proportion whose whole schooling has been via this method (Lockhart 2009).
We now turn to contrast the average entry profile of the Russell Group universities in England with the remainder of the English higher education sector, with reference to the proportion of students recruited (a) from state schools and colleges, and (b) from NS-SEC groups 4 to 7. For this analysis, two comparator groups have been constructed.
The first is a 'Pre-1992' group of those institutions that had university status prior to 1992, which broadly form the stratum immediately below the Russell Group in terms of reputation. These are typically medium-sized institutions with a strong research base. 24 institutions are included in this group, comprising around 25% of the total student population (and therefore of a similar overall size as the Russell Group).
The second is an 'Other' group of higher education institutions composed of those which are not members of the Russell Group or the Pre-1992 group. This is a very heterogeneous group, dominated by the former polytechnics and colleges which became universities in 1992 or in the eighteen years since. It also includes a number of higher education colleges and small specialist colleges; this 'Other' group comprises around half of the contemporary higher education sector by student numbers.
In order to construct the average entry profile statistics for the Russell Group, Pre-1992 group and
Other group presented below, the individual performance indicators for each institution were extracted from the HESA datasets and arithmetically weighted by the size of their entry cohort before being aggregated into either the Russell Group, Pre-1992 group or Other group average.
This was undertaken for each of the six academic years, where data was available.
A. State schools and colleges
The average percentages for entrance from state schools and colleges for the two groups are presented in Table 2 [ Table 2 here]
[ Figure 1 here] but they continue to lag well behind the Other and Pre-1992 groups in terms of the proportion of their entrants from this educational route. Their rate of growth has also been slower than the national average. The Russell Group universities have not improved their position with respect to students from lower socio-economic groups, as this proportion has remained fixed at around 19 percent. Similarly, the majority of the fifteen institutions are faring worse since the implementation of the 2004 Act relative to the expectations set of them through the location adjusted benchmark.
It would, however, be wrong to assume that these broad trends can be attributed directly to the changes implemented in 2006/07. With one exception (i.e. performance of Russell Group universities against the state school and college benchmark), there are no obvious changes in student profiles that occur precisely at this threshold. This is despite the significant changes to student funding and the new fair access expectations placed on institutions through OFFA. It might be argued that such changes would need time to bed down before the policy objectives are met. However, three years have now passed and there is no sign of the types of shift that were sought by the Act. While the outreach activities contained in Access Agreements might be expected to take time to bear fruit, as we have seen, the radical changes to student funding were predicted to have instant and catastrophic results; these have quite simply not come to pass, in terms of initial entry at least.
It could be hypothesised that the academic years either side of significant change may be unusual.
Students have a degree of choice about when they choose to enter higher education, as seen through the increasingly common phenomenon of 'gap years' (Heath 2007). They may, therefore, take an active decision to maximise their financial resources by either delaying (for better state support or the chance to accumulate savings) or bringing forward (to avoid adverse state support changes) their entry (Wainwright 2005) . No information is available on students who attempt to 'play the system' in this way, but it may go some way to explaining why a single event effect is not found. Another explanation could be that the highly-publicised and controversial changes, which had been in the public arena since the publication of the White Paper in 2003, were actually exerting some effect before their implementation. This could occur through heightened public awareness of the costs of higher education or misunderstanding leading to a belief that changes, especially negative ones, had been enacted earlier than reality. In the absence of repeated studies of student attitudes in this period, it is impossible to assess this possibility directly. There was certainly a sharp jump in public opinion concerning access to higher education and student 
